This paper examines the history of an unknown "mass murder" perpetrated in  in Southern Vietnam by the Viet Minh forces. It was organized in the outskirts of Saigon, mainly against Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious forces that were portrayed as "reactionary" during their political revolutionary trials. Before presenting and analyzing the data of nearly  victims, the paper briefly presents the social, political and military conquest and context of French Cochinchina, as well as explains the political and military ambitions of the Viet Minh forces after the advent of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi on September , . The focal point of this article is the review of the data related to the massacre and its uses, i.e. what they can reveal about the course of the massacre, its actors and victims. Finally, the paper's last section assesses the official historiography of the massacre, which has been recognized by the current regime in a 'soft' mea culpa. In conclusion, this article discusses the issue of violence in Southern Vietnam and its consequences for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in a more long term perspective.
Introduction
In his book, Gaston Bouthoul engaged in an analysis of what he termed the 'war phenomenon' and suggested a methodology to help understand the morphology and nature of wars under an appellation scarcely employed today, that of 'polemology'.
1 For about fifteen years now, the phenomenon of 'massacre' has been considered the subject-matter of history to be studied, deciphered and understood on its own. An increasingly precise typology of massacre is emerging.
2 These studies were developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, with the aim of both confronting the horror of the Nazi extermination system and preserving, for future generations, memories of the acts of violence perpetrated during the war.
3 As Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan emphasise, after a particularly slow start mass crime and genocide studies expanded rapidly during the s. 4 Likewise, studies on issues of violence in the twentieth century and their relationship to the onset of modernity deserve reflection and analysis.
The Vietnam War has its own series of massacres of the twentieth century. Through direct American involvement in South Vietnamese territory, the war provided the world with a media-hyped image of a society 'brutalised' by war. To this effect, the My Lai massacre, which took place in a village in central Vietnam, remains the most striking and undoubtedly the most studied to this day.
6 However, the lengthy conflict that plagued Vietnam for over thirty years has to some degree overshadowed colonial massacres in French-occupied Indochina, during and after the violent conquest of Vietnamese territory by the French army.
7 For the historian, it is an arduous task to place clear milestones to describe massacres perpetrated in Vietnam throughout the twentieth century without attracting controversy. Some legitimise the violence accompanying revolution as a reaction against colonial or imperialist violence. Others tend to place the onus on a fratricidal confrontation and civil war born out of extremist ideologies and foreign intervention. There is a tendency to create a hierarchy of the horrors that have been perpetrated, either to diminish their scale or, on the contrary, to call for a partial indictment.
8 This is not about creating 'moral history', of which Charles Mayer has indicated the limits, but simply about analysing data brought to light through archives recently made available for public scrutiny.
After these historiographical remarks, a number of 'mass crimes' must be seriously considered, beginning with colonial times. 9 In the mid-nineteenth century, early massacres organised by educated Vietnamese resisting Western colonialists targeted Vietnamese Catholic village settlements in the central region of the country. These people were considered traitors to their country and emperor. 10 The chronological series of massacres in Vietnam took on a new dimension with French colonisation. In order to establish its authority, the colonial government deployed large-scale military action against hostile rebel forces. Between  and , the 'pacification' of Vietnam gave rise to several operations that aimed to eradicate a determined resistance and independence movement, which was embodied in the Can Vuong (Aid to the King) movement until the last rebel chief (Hoang Hoa Tham) capitulated in . The period that followed saw no end to either rebellions or acts of repression of a greater or lesser degree. The year  in particular saw the culmination of the repression of anticolonial forces, with the aerial bombing of villages in the northern and central parts of the country following large-scale uprisings orchestrated by the National Party of Vietnam (VNQDD) in February  and by the Soviets of the Nghe Tinh up to .
11 Witnesses have spoken of harsh repression against Vietnamese insurgents resulting in thousands of victims.
12 The year  was marked by a massive repression against the insurgency forces, represented this time by nationalists from the Army for National Restoration (Phuc Quoc Quan) and the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). This repression occurred after fresh armed insurrections broke out in the North and South of the country at a time when French Indochina was opening its doors to Imperial Japan.
Extreme Violence Among the Vietnamese
The Japanese overthrow of French colonial rule on  March  momentarily marked an interruption in the repression of anticolonial revolt. However, the onset of the August revolution and the advent of the Viet Minh at the helm of power at the close of August  did not put an end to assassinations or to the massacre of civilians. 13 The object of repression shifted to forces hostile to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), the founder and principal leader of the Viet Minh Front. The historian Tran Huy Lieu (-), a defector from the VNQDD to the ICP in  and Minister for Information and Propaganda under the Ho Chi Minh governments -, asserted that the objective of the revolution (doi tuong cach mang) had to be altered during the revolutionary process initiated by the ICP between  and . From a battle against French and Japanese forces, it turned into a fight only against the Japanese after the putsch of March , followed by an attempt in the month of August to seize power from the pro-Japanese government and from 'reactionary forces', such as the influential National Party of Great Vietnam (Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang) in the North. 14 The assassinations of opponents, as embodied by members of non-communist nationalist parties, rapidly grew in number. The assassinations of French nationals, persons of mixed race and 'Vietnamese traitors' (Viet gian) were regularly and scrupulously recorded by the French High Commissioner for Indochina (FHC) from late . Witness accounts and narratives all testified to the extreme violence inflicted upon victims' bodies. In order to strike fear among the people, executions were often carried out in public.
15
After the infamous massacre of Herault City on  September  in Saigon, Vietnam slipped into a renewed cycle of violence fuelled by a long battle for independence. The de facto independence bestowed upon Bao Dai by the Japanese on  March  and consolidated after  September  by Ho Chi Minh was denied at the end of the same month by the French authorities. 'The Gaulois do not want to utter the word "independence",' recalled Jean Rouget, a civil service administrator. 16 The return of the French military to the North was carried out in the thunder of a well-planned and particularly violent reconquest operation, as proved by the criminal bombing of Haiphong City in November , a massacre of civilians that left an estimated , dead.
17 Caught in the death throes of a prolonged civil war and of a national territory torn in two between  and , the Vietnamese people paid a heavy price during the war. If we take into account the 'six wars' that broke out in succession between  and , the final tally is particularly heavy.
18 As for the internal conflict, in North Vietnam (DRV) during the agrarian reform of the s, in the South (RVN) when Hue was briefly under the control of revolutionary communist forces in , and during the purge operations by the FNL forces, similar to Operation Phoenix (-), a series of massacres has endlessly punctuated the history of this war.
19 The unleashing of this violence deserves further analysis. Some feel that the root of the Vietnam War lay in colonisation and the radicalisation of political forces when faced with France's incapacity to reach out. 20 The international context and especially the revolutionary developments in Russia and Asia had an impact on emancipation from the colonial yoke, through their sheer violence. For the historian Tran Huy Lieu, the August revolution, born from the process of a -year struggle, was assuredly an armed uprising (cuoc bao dong vu trang) in which violence was justified.
21 The extreme violence among the Vietnamese still remains to be fully studied. Yet its analysis broadens a historical vision narrowly split between colonialists and colonised. It allows us to go beyond the conventional opposition of the conflict and forces us to reconsider the interactions between the parties involved.
In order to contribute to this unfolding history of Vietnamese 'massacrology', the subject of this article returns to an historical event: an unprecedented 'mass crime' perpetrated in  by Viet Minh forces just outside Saigon against religious forces or forces presented as 'reactionaries'. Before the presentation and analysis of the data, however, it is necessary to review the social, political and military context of the French reconquest of Cochinchina. Second, we will expound on the political and military ambitions of the Viet Minh with the advent of the DRV in Hanoi on  September  before critically reviewing the data and their use. Subsequently, we shall attempt to analyse the data so as to understand how the massacre occurred and to reveal the various actors and victims. Finally we shall return to the official historiographical reading of this massacre.
Nam Bo: A Complex Context Marked by the French Reconquest
The situation in Nam Bo has always been among the most complex owing to the particular status of Cochinchina since . For over seventy years until , Cochinchina was administered by governor-admirals, and later by governor-generals of Indochina, as a French territory.
22 This territory came officially under Vietnamese control only much later, in June , when the independence and unity of Vietnam under Bao Dai was officially recognised after a long process of negotiation with France initiated in .
23 Interactions between the colonial power and local populations must not be underestimated. This new pioneering Vietnamese front, consolidated throughout the eighteenth century at the expense of the declining neighbouring Khmer kingdom, had always been an ethnic, social and political crossroads, a frontier zone open to the outer world, a melting pot and merchant enclave, a region abounding with new popular beliefs.
The early twentieth century witnessed the rise of two new religions deeply rooted in the Mekong Delta: Cao Dai in , under the leadership of Le Van Trung, and Buddhism, renewed as Hoa Hao in  with Huynh Phu So.
24 The development of these two religious forces, which rapidly gained popular favour, would eventually hamper the establishment of political parties, Any entity wishing to assume a political role in the southern delta had to contend with these three forces: in the best of situations allying with them or, in the worst, fighting against them. This problem marked the tumultuous relations between the French, the Viet Minh, the Vietnam of Bao Dai and later the national government of Ngo Dinh Diem from  onwards. During this period, the Mekong Delta illustrated the particular features of the state's heightened fragmentation. This served to foster the emergence of these local religious and ethnic powers, thereby paving the way for numerous political battles and violence. 25 The integration of the delta into the national territory would thereafter be constantly troubled.
The historian Tran Huy Lieu stresses the fact that revolutionary developments were not uniform across the territory and that there was a significant disparity between regions, especially between the North and South. 26 In the latter, the communist movement was dismantled after the  uprising and re-emerged only in , while the Viet Minh movement was still far from being unified.
27 The independence movement began to accelerate only after  March  and even then it favoured the paramilitary Avant-Garde Youths (Thanh Nien Tien Phong) headed by Dr Pham Ngoc Thach. Each of these religious movements developed between  and , benefiting from Japanese support and the defeat of the ICP after the failed Nam Ky insurrection. The political vacuum therefore led to the expansion of the two movements.
28
When the French resumed their military presence in the South in September, the situation was most confused: with English forces backing them up, the French laid siege to Saigon by the end of September . French prisoners were rearmed and newly landed Expeditionary Corps troops undertook the military reconquest of Saigon. The city was secured, although the periphery still remained under the control of a multitude of Vietnamese troops affiliated to the Viet Minh, nationalist parties or, deeper in the delta, to religious forces. Rival and non-unified Vietnamese forces formed a fragile nebula that constantly attacked French troops. Given the need for efficiency, the control of these disparate forces became a critical stake for the Vietnamese resistance. From April , two potentially rival chiefs emerged: Nguyen Binh (Nguyen Phuong Thao), previously a member of the National Party (VNQDD), and Bay Vien (Le Van Vien), the main leader of the Binh Xuyen.
29 The two acted in concert during the initial phase of the resistance before going their separate ways in June . The fearsome Nguyen Binh, dispatched by Ho Chi Minh in November  to unify the resistance in the South, landed in Cochinchina.
30 Out of sheer necessity, he turned his attention towards the integration of the armed Cao Dai forces of Tran Quang Vinh within the Viet Minh.
31
The Vietnamese resistance was unified under the control of the Viet Minh in  and inflicted several debilitating strikes upon French military installations. Nonetheless, many forces affiliated to the Viet Minh began to break away, refusing to buckle under the leadership of ICP political commissioners or Nguyen Binh's violent methods. The French Expeditionary Corps forces now realised they had a role to play among the population in order to reconquer entire sections of the Mekong Delta, which gradually slipped away from the communist organisation. To accomplish this, a policy called 'rallying the sects' was implemented towards Cao Dai and Hoa Hao followers, as well as the important Binh Xuyen forces that had begun to withdraw from the resistance. After a period of negotiation with Tran Quang Vinh, an agreement was signed on  January  between the armed Cao Dai forces and the French military authorities. 
34
Finally, the Binh Xuyen, with an estimated strength of , well-armed fighters, were highly coveted for strategic reasons by both the nationalist chiefs and the Viet Minh executive committee in Nam Bo. The French military authorities regarded 'a full amnesty for all infractions and crimes, political and non-political' as a sine qua non for rallying the Binh Xuyen.
35 The Viet Minh politics in the delta must be understood against this tense climate. Caught in a quagmire, the predicament of the Viet Minh at this moment is summarised in an expression transmitted by official history, i.e. to 'lose neither population nor land' (mat dan, mat dat) and to try to 'save them' (giu dan, giu dat) by any means.
The Political and Military Ambitions of the Viet Minh in West Saigon
After the revolution of August , the Viet Minh never stopped trying to consolidate the power they had acquired under extraordinary circumstances in August . To do so, they had to undertake a tricky political and military manoeuvre north of the th parallel with the non-communist revolutionaries of the VNQDD and DMH fronts. The plan was illustrated by a series of negotiations, transitory agreements and assassinations, ending with a general military offensive against underground anti-Viet Minh nationalists. In the South, the situation was far more sensitive. The Viet Minh had emerged victorious from the political manoeuvres organised in August to assume the control of the people's forces but 'their dictatorship' was con- advantage, so taking power in Saigon-Cholon and the provinces occurred without any obstacles; especially in the concluding scenario: the Viet Minh front appeared with the yellow-starred flag (red) replacing that of the Avant-Garde Youths, a yellow flag with a red star.
38
The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious forces as well as the leaders of the nationalist parties were hoodwinked by the audacity of the ICP and hardly inclined to support a communist stranglehold over the South. The nationalist parties were critical of ICP local cadres for having seized political power from them during a massive demonstration on  August  and for exercising terror over non-communist forces. The nationalists accused the Viet Minh of not honouring the agreement on three points of consensus with respect to the united front.
39 As everyone claimed membership of the Viet Minh, the issue bore upon anti-French leadership and the creation of the Nam Bo Committee. The domination by the ICP over the Nam Bo Committee and the sheer disregard for basic democratic procedure scandalised nationalist leaders. The spiritual leader of the Hoa Hao, Huynh Phu So, stood as an open and direct opponent to Tran Van Giau, the communist leader and key organiser of the  August demonstration in Saigon.
40 Relations between the two men were tense.
41 Indeed, the arrest of  Hoa Hao followers, including the secretary of Huynh Phu So just after the Viet Minh seized power, had sent a clear signal about the intentions of the ICP cadres. committees' (ban am sat), came into action. In particular, the nationalist leader Duong Van Giao, president of a national government (Chinh phu Dan quoc) free of communists and heavily infiltrated by the Dai Viet, was the main target of the Viet Minh Police.
43
Even as the return of France seemed imminent in early September, the organisation of Tran Van Giau tried to do away with nationalist leaders through assassinations and in fact slowed down the united resistance against France. From October, Bui Quang Chieu, an important figure in the political sphere in Saigon, was arrested and assassinated in Cho Dem. Other leading nationalist personalities such as Vu Tam Anh (Nguyen Ngoc Nhan) or Duong Van Giao were also arrested.
44 Just like Ta Thu Thau, condemned and executed in the Quang Ngai, the main Trotskyist leaders and those linked to the Avant-Garde Youths were eliminated in October .
45 For tactical reasons and to protect the still fragile communist organisation, Tran Van Giau recommended the dissolution of the four Vietnamese regiments (su doan) of Saigon, resulting in the splitting and weakening of the resistance. This sudden retreat from Saigon facilitated a quick resettlement of French forces. 46 The situation was chaotic. There was an explosion of score-settling between the real and fake Viet Minh (Viet Minh thiec, Viet Minh gia). Sent by Ho Chi Minh with a mission to quickly unite the resistance, Nguyen Binh began to organise military companies (chi doi) under the control of ICP political cadres as well as those of the Dai Viet or the Binh Xuyen. Between  and , the charismatic chief reorganised the resistance forces on several occasions. The objective was from now on to achieve political unification under the control of the ICP. In a triangle between Hoc Mon, Duc Hoa and Trang Bang, northwest of Saigon, the reorganisation aimed to give the Viet Minh total control of a region considered strategic and close to the capital city of the Cochinchina Republic.
48 With its bush land, forests, ricefields and rubber plantations, the zone was rich in possibilities for military counter-attacks. It would continue to be so even throughout the course of the war against the Americans.
49 This axis linked the Cao Dai fiefdom of Tay Ninh to the community situated at Cholon. Having quite accurately gauged the military strength of the Cao Dai force and its stronghold over the peasantry, the Viet Minh made an attempt to close in during .
50 A process was set in train, consisting of tacit agreements, rejected reconciliation and rejections of any consensus on a common strategy, which resulted in open conflict. 51 In their armed opposition to the French forces, the Cao Dai chose a personal strategy that would jeopardise Viet Minh ambitions in the region of Tay Ninh. The Viet Minh were convinced that the Cao Dai were engaged in territorial expansion towards Saigon through a three-phase action plan: 'military preparation, divide or spread discord within the resistance, and finally oust the revolutionary powers and install a Cao Dai power in the region'. Le Van Hoach, a Cao Dai member close to the nationalists of the Dai Viet, the Viet Minh's fears appeared well-founded.
53
The year  was a turning point for the resistance. On the one hand Ho Chi Minh himself in January demanded the intensification of sabotage activities, which he endorsed with a historical dimension:
Our troops being few in number, it is most essential that they contribute to the general work of destruction in Cochinchina. Ensure that neither a single grain of paddy nor a single hectare of rubber falls into enemy hands.
Sabotage all routes of communication, bridges and roads. Sabotage the ammunition depots and enemy food supplies. Push the sabotage all the way to Saigon-Cholon. This zone shall take on the sector name of Ho Chi Minh. We must show the world that our resistance is competent.
54
On the other hand, the two major military forces linked with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious movements broke away from Nguyen Binh permanently.
55
The Viet Minh thus lost two key allies and consequently the anti-French resistance was left weakened. 66 The objective of the Viet Minh was to purge the Saigon belt of Cao Dai forces. These multiple reorganisations should not conceal the main objective of Nguyen Binh, revealed during the course of a meeting held in the jungle on  May  with a view to creating a rear military base close to Saigon-Cholon. The chief of the southern resistance made a point of castigating Saigon, the administrative, economic, military and commercial centre of French colonialism and a concentration of all reactionaries, various autonomous groups of the Nam Ky and the Popular Front of Cochinchina. He urged a radical solution, 'regretting that the scorched-earth policy had not been applied since the start of hostilities':
To destroy Saigon is to destroy the singular machine of exploitation of French and Indochinese colonialists, to snuff out the French colonialist.
To destroy Saigon is to end hostilities, to stop bloodshed. To destroy Saigon is an action most legitimate and human.
67
Shortly before this hateful declaration, in April , the Country Committee of the Viet Minh in the South had sent a directive to the Command of the th Military Zone of Nguyen Binh and other provinces recommending that two approaches to be adopted vis-à-vis the Cao Dai: first, maintain the status quo and gain the support and participation of the Cao Dai in the resistance; and second, resolve to severely punish troublesome elements, lackeys of the French and opponents of the resistance.
68 If taken seriously, the double rhetoric of Ho Chi Minh's directives of January  and those of Nguyen Binh in May  gave free rein to the local military and political Viet Minh chiefs who, at their own discretion, triggered a spiral of violence and hatred in May.
The Elements and Possibilities of Political Exploitation
From the time they landed in the South, the French resumed their control in Saigon. Very early on, their information services understood the need to organise counter-propaganda against the Viet Minh in anticipation of an eventual counter-guerrilla movement. In particular, it was necessary to exploit the violence festering in the South, of which the Viet Minh were the prime instigators. The FHC services began to record, in a near-consistent manner, all acts of violence perpetrated in Hanoi or Saigon and in reconquered provinces. However, the FHC wanted to go further in using victim accounts to politically discredit Ho Chi Minh. To this effect, a circular signed by Cédile, Commissioner of the French Republic in Cochinchina, and addressed to the Director of Information, stated: 'In my view, this would be an opportune moment to rally public opinion-both in France and in the world-and exploit the atrocities committed by the Viet Minh on the French as well as their own fellow citizens.'
69 This data-gathering on abuses by the Viet Minh had to be done with care, according to Cédile, so as to testify about barbaric acts, as stipulated in the new circular of  November :
I would be grateful to you if you could find and send me all personal accounts you might gather on these crimes-I want clear documents devoid of commentaries, but which expose facts with precision. It is indispensable to furnish these reports with all the exact information necessary (date and place, names of victims; witnesses and if possible the criminals). These texts will be disseminated by the services of the Commission of the Republic (Department of Political Affairs and Department of Information) and will be grouped together later in a collection which will testify to the barbarism of those who do not hesitate, in order to satisfy their personal ambitions, to plunge their own country into bloodshed and flames. At the end of , the dossier 'Viet Minh atrocities' appeared to be complete. It was merely a collection of scores of documents gathered from , consisting of witness accounts, photographs, lists of convicts and reports seized from the Viet Minh.
71 In March , the dispatch of convict lists was meant to be addressed to the French League of Human Rights, the Red Cross and the provisional government of South Vietnam.
72 Despite all the intentions of the FHC, documents relating to hundreds of assassination cases were scarcely examined. Only the local French press reported this Viet Minh 'terrorism' which had crippled the South for years.
73 This general lack of interest raises questions. A letter from Léon Pignon highlighted the lack of military resources and suggests tension between departments.
74 Perhaps it is based more simply in French military action, the military reconquest inflicting an equally violent reaction to the Viet Minh control over the countryside. Violence during wartime is never unilateral. War operations conducted by the Foreign Legion between August and October  seemed to have been the most violent, according to Jeanne Cuisinier. 75 The reoccupation of Saigon and subsequently the prime highways of the Mekong Delta gave rise to a stream of brutal executions carried out against an enemy of indistinct identity. bers a particularly gruelling baptism of fire when his lookouts (Vietnamese?) were found, one impaled on bamboo, the two others horribly mutilated. He says that this experience strongly changed his attitude towards the Viet Minh adversary: 'Gradually, I became like the ancients. I wanted to kill a maximum number of these scoundrels. Never in cold blood could I have done so. But always after discovering butcheries of this kind. And sadly, there were many of them.'
77
On  December , the Viet Minh resistance retreated deeper underground. The French Expeditionary Corps got its hands on exceptional Viet Minh documents during a military operation on the island of An Phu.
78 They revealed important handwritten lists of convicted persons prepared by the Viet Minh Police. A first document, entitled 'List of convicts', consisted of a list of  names (Photo ). The cover of the document read: 'List of convicts by VM Police of Hoc Mon'. The second list, entitled 'List of accused', provided a list of  names (Photo ). The French Troops for South Indochina (TFIS) renamed the documents, and a large amount of the information they contained was compiled into a new list of over  names, accompanied by a presentation letter dated March  (Photo ). This list has been provisionally deciphered as described below. It was established from three documents issued by the Viet Minh Police Service of Hoc Mon (pages  to ), Tan Binh (pages  to ) and Thu Duc (pages  to ).
79 Of this reconstituted set, the 'List of death sentences by the VM Police of Hoc Mon' is by far the most important, with nearly  names or about . per cent of the total. The second and third documents group, respectively,  names (. per cent) and  (. per cent). The compilation raises a number of questions. Was it a list prepared on a weak documentary basis? Was the existence of duplicated names important and required? In short, was the reconstituted list contrived? To the final last question, it may be said that the author of the reconstituted list had made a selection, noting down only death sentences. The analysis of the handwritten list 'List of convicts' has shown that the majority of those individuals who were arrested and tried were sentenced to death, while a minority received only a fine.
83 The care taken in the writing of these original documents appears to show that they were prepared by educated cadres. The register entitled 'List of convicts' is dated  December  and signed by Le Van Ren, the secondin-command of Public Security of Hoc Mon district.
84 It was intended for the chief of Public Security of Gia Dinh (Truong ty cong an Gia Dinh).
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The second original document, also a carefully written logbook, bears the code 'Z III' on its cover. It belongs to a 'Z' series comprising other packet lists (goi) numbered from ZA to Z.
86
The list we have chosen for its length is of an altogether different nature because it is a typewritten document set out and duplicated in several copies using carbon paper. This list must have been subjected to several preliminary verifications on the number of entries inscribed. A research of homonyms 82) The rate of overlap of information divulged concerning the two lists is as follows: nearly  per cent of the information of the list containing  names ('List of convicts') was present on the typed list. However, the overlap rate of the list containing  names ('List of accused') is lower. A total of  names (duplications and doubtful entries included,  names) out of  were present on the reconstituted list, roughly a little over  per cent. 

detected nearly  possible duplications in a list of  names. However, going by cross-checks and eliminations, the proportion of duplications is reduced to . per cent of the overall total.
87 The treatment of these lists consisted in processing the data for each individual. The table on the numbers of convicts provides information on their place of origin, charges, religious or political affiliation, social status, the name of the people's court or local police and the date of judgment which, depending on individuals, matches that of the date of execution.
88 Other documents also provide the age of the convict and details of his parentage. We have added gender as and when the information was identifiable.
The distribution of the places of origin provides an insight into the geography of this listing. Most of the localities from which the convicts hailed were villages surrounding Saigon in a triangle around Hoc Mon, Duc Hoa and Trang Bang. However, other names give the impression that the round-ups may have been carried out by the Viet Minh in reoccupied localities far away from French Expeditionary Corps forces.
An analysis of charges yields results that are somewhat surprising. While military operations by the Viet Minh in this region largely targeted the Cao Dai, the victims tagged 'Cao Dai' or 'Cao Dai reactionaries' were not the most important. In this affiliation category are listed  names (the 'purified list') or . per cent of the total.
89 Despite an apparent variety of charges,  per cent are centred on three principal 'crimes' (reactionaries, spies and traitors). 90 The most frequent charge is that of 'reactionary' (phan dong) with  occurrences, nearly one-third of the total (. per cent of the purified list), thereby exposing the political nature of this purification. This proportion increases when one adds the categories 'Cao Dai reactionaries' and 'Hoa Hao reactionaries'. The different charges emphasise the eminently political character 87) See diagram 'General configuration'. 88) This is what note  on page  of this document mentions. In addition, note  indicates that the names of people sentenced to death marked with an asterisk (handwritten in black ink) have their dossier enclosed. Verifications were done using these dossiers conserved in the archives. 89) We provide these percentages based on a list containing  names, with genuine and supposed duplications removed, as well as sentences without a subject ( occurrences). See diagram 'Charges (reduced list)'. 90) In order of importance, one may cite the following assembled categories: reactionaries, espionage and intelligence with the enemy, traitors and collaborators, Cao Dai followers, informers and police agents of the Police, Hoa Hao, subversive agents, pirates and hoodlums, partisans or enemy soldiers.
List of convicts
General configuration of the operation. It was not so much about hunting down Hoa Hao and Cao Dai followers in the region, but rather eradicating the 'reaction' of these communities to submission. A Viet Minh directive dated  June and signed by Ung Van Khiem, Commissioner for Internal Affairs of the Nam Bo Executive Committee, confirmed this approach:
After a few months of fighting the invaders on the outside, and traitors to the nation from within, we have seen that: … During purification operations against the traitors, the VQD [Police], the armed services and self-defence troops have exposed, with praiseworthy clairvoyance, the gang of dangerous traitors to the future of the Fatherland. The superstitious population has thus been duped by them: this act of purging of traitors who incite a revolution, we do against our will, with the intention of defending the nation, and not out of personal vengeance.
… we must know at all times that among the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, there are always sincere and innocent people without a single treacherous thought. They have acted without discernment, ensnared by the insidious words of their leaders …
The experience shows us yet that several Cao Dai and Hoa Hao followers acknowledged that they had been misled and abandoned their ranks to return to the resistance. The names from people's courts provide a general idea of the localities concerned, all of which were located in the periphery of Saigon. Of the  names, three stand out from the set of  occurrences or . per cent of the total (list before purification).
92 The name of the Hoc Mon Police (Cong an Hoc Mon) near Saigon ranks first. This name alone accounts for . per cent of the total. The Police of Tan Binh (. per cent), also in the outskirts of Saigon, come next and finally the Thu Duc Police (. per cent), in the eastern part of the city. Is a typology of victims possible? Judging by the charges and places of origin, a majority of the victims seemed to belong to the ordinary people and local peasantry. Very few names were affiliated to the councils of notables and similarly very few hailed from Saigon City. There are few political affiliations to be found (only one member of the Social Democrat Party and a handful belonging to the Cochinchinese Front).
93 It has been alleged, although verification is arduous to undertake, that entire families accused of being reactionaries were arrested and executed. A number of people hailing from the same locality were tried and executed, leaving one to surmise that they may have been members of one and the same family.
94 Lastly, the matter of date of execution merits further attention because these dates reveal significant disparities.
95
An analysis of the evolution of executions for the year  shows that the months between May and November were particularly lethal.
96 October  reveals a sharp increase in the number of executions. Should one concentrate on the passage of this particular month, what might one observe? A disturbing peak of executions took place on  October , with  executions in a single day, or about one-third of the total number of executions in . What happened on this dark day? A year earlier, the French Expeditionary Corps forces, specifically the rd Colonial Infantry Division (e DIC), had carried out a violent anti-Viet Minh 'purging operation' at Hoc Mon and in its surrounding areas. The account by Jeanne Cuisinier mentioned earlier reports of what a legion officer had said about a 'purging' operation: 'We suffered losses, but we also responded well and inflicted a lot of damage. Within a -kilometre radius, nothing remains: from ducks to cattle, women and children; we have purged everything.'
98 Jeanne Cuisinier also highlights: 'During the nights of ,  and  October [] , particularly "rewarding" pillages at Hoc Mon, Ba Diem and Go Vap by colonial soldiers.'
99
Was the choice of  October  as the date of execution influenced by these events? This is a hypothesis.
100 It could have well been a counter-attack by the Police of Hoc Mon faced with a deteriorating military situation or a political operation using terror as its instrument: a lesson to be borne in mind by the undecided. The fact that those arrested were identified, organised into social classes and given political labels tells us that we are in the presence of a terror, based on a revolutionary logic intended to force a recalcitrant population into submission.
The ICP cadres, although forming a minority within the resistance, aimed to organise, structure and purify it. The profusion of documents issued by the Viet Minh during the war explains this political drive and simultaneously highlights a bureaucratic culture learned in Moscow in the service of revolution. The lists established show that the DRV machinery in the South with its two regulatory bodies, the Cong An (Public Security) and the army, had already entered into a bureaucratic process in which it was necessary to record all information on the enemy, within or without. The nationalist parties, to our knowledge, did not produce as much administrative documentation.
101 For their part, during their confrontation with the Viet Minh, the Hoa Hao cadres did not take the trouble to prepare lists of their victims. The victims were eliminated by the military before being hurled into the river, as battalion leader Antoine Savani described. The question of a bureaucratic culture is perhaps more important than it appears. This is because the preparation of paperwork requiring such heavy administration shows a ready willingness on the part of DRV representatives of the South to act as watchdogs of a society to be revolutionised, as arbitrators of state law for the DRV at war, as upholders of the nation's legitimacy. It means asserting national law over the territory which indeed escaped the DRV. This is because constituting legality with the establishment of the Republic of Cochinchina (June ) and its structuring over southern territory was an enormous challenge, perhaps even a provocation, for the resistance members of the ICP staking their claim to the DRV.
102

Justifications for the Violence and Historiographical Mea Culpa
We now turn to examining the unleashing of violence in Nam Bo in  through the most emblematic conflict in the delta, which opposed the Viet Minh against the Hoa Hao. Jacques Sémelin suggested grasping the rational and irrational aspects of the massacre: 'which may be attributed to cold calculation and the sheer madness of men'.
103 The revolutionary war, led in the delta by Nguyen Binh, organised and implemented terror, as the following account recalls:
In Cochinchina, Nguyen Binh … brilliant and bloodthirsty, faced a never-ending phase of regression. Having lost the Plain of Reeds and its rice granary, he began to resettle in the forests far north of Tay Ninh. The duplicitous game of the Cao Dai was as repulsive to him as to us. At this time, a battalion of regular combatants, the chu-lucs, laid siege to a Cao Dai post and impaled on bamboo men, women and children who were supposed to take care of defence.
104
The aim was to make a striking impact on minds regarding the revolutionary intransigence throughout the Nam Bo in the battle for independence. Nguyen Binh, a former member of the VNQDD who later converted to Communism undoubtedly nurtured high ideals on the patriotic struggle. The antagonistic vision of the Ho Chi Minh government was adamant in refusing any 
 Dates of execution 
The place of the date  October  compromise on this issue.
105 Nguyen Binh had clearly articulated and justified the war stakes during a meeting on  May : Act, so that the colonialists, like the traitors, eat without any appetite and sleep in anxiety. Act such that they cannot export our rice and our rubber in exchange for arms and tanks. And to this end, a single means: sabotage, assassination, repression of traitors.
106
However, in the peculiar situation of the South, the revolutionary process of 'destruction/submission' came up against the religious sentiments of the peasantry-a messianism, which also aimed to be unrelenting. In another account of the Police of Nam Bo, the authors recall the fanaticism of the Cao Dai in battle, feared even by bo doi warriors of the Viet Minh.
107 Among the Hoa Hao, violence against Viet Minh supporters seemed to be the rule. The two factions were filled with hatred, as emphasised by Nguyen Long Thanh Nam in his impressive monograph on the Hoa Hao and by Mai Chi Tho in his memoirs. If the former cautiously mentions the presence in West Cochinchina 'of many brawls between the Hoa Hao and the Viet Minh, creating a tense atmosphere which could lead to a grave incident', 108 Mai Chi Tho unhesitatingly recalls the state of mind of the Viet Minh during this period vis-à-vis the Hoa Hao:
Our people and our army were concentrating their force against the French when we were stabbed by a poisonous dagger in the back; this is why with indignation and rancour, eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, we deliver blows with all our strength. The massacre was really terrifying. We had fallen into the very trap set earlier by the French imperialists, just as our forefathers did.
109
He justified the violence of the Viet Minh as a response to the violence of their adversaries and implied that the Viet Minh were finally no better than 105) As the passage of the directive dated  May  from the Central Committee stipulates: 'All the persons who try to pass as representatives of the people, who assume the responsibility to negotiate with the French are considered Vietnamese felons, and shall be judged by the Government for crimes of high treason, intelligence with the enemy and shall be punished by the law', in Van Kien Dang toan tap, tap , p. .  their opponents at the start of the conflict. In his view, the Viet Minh were ensnared by violence, the conventional weapon of imperialism.
110 For his part, Savani did not mince his words when referring to the violent conflict that began in September  between the Viet Minh and the Hoa Hao: 'The formal massacres of the Hoa Hao were organised and drowning ended in countless victims, creating a climate of violence and hatred that was not likely to vanish.'
111 If Savani is to be believed, the siege of western provinces by Expeditionary Corps forces put a temporary end to Viet Minh's atrocities and reversed the situation:
The followers of Nam Lua, a gang of trouble-makers, would carry out reprehensible acts of revenge. The collective massacres of the Viet Minh and its sympathisers were organised. The procedure used was mass drowning, otherwise known as 'shrimping'-one saw them (the VM) then, tied to one another, hands behind their backs, like trains of abandoned junks, passing before your cai-nha drifting with the current and ebbing tide.
112
On this issue, Mai Chi Tho painted a horrendous picture of abuses committed by loyalist Hoa Hao and Cao Dai members:
Many Hoa Hao and Cao Dai followers were guilty of barbaric crimes such as setting houses on fire, assassinations, disembowelling people, ripping out the innards of our compatriots, our combatants. There were posts like Phu My (My Tho) where the flesh of the combatants was chopped up for sale. All the boats that passed by were stopped and forced to buy it. If you refused they would terrorise you with savagery. Not knowing what to do, once the purchase was made and they had gone far away, our compatriots left the human flesh adrift in the water, burnt incense, and invoked the Manes as a mark of respect, completely horrified by this clique of ignoble barbarians.
113
In reality, relations between the ICP and the Hoa Hao had been steeped in conflict since the early days of August . On  September , at Can Tho, the capital of the Kingdom of the West according to Hoa Hao loyalists, an armed confrontation took place between Viet Minh partisans and Hoa Hao loyalists, ending in the arrest and execution of three Hoa Hao members, including Huynh Phu Mau, the brother of Huynh Phu So. Lam Tam Truong, close to the Hoa Hao, provides a bloodier description of this incident:
They had come, nearly , of them, believing themselves to be invincible, armed with bamboo spears, iron knives and their peasant tools. The others, having been informed, lay in wait for them. They decimated the crowd with their machine-guns. For several days, the river carried corpses out to sea. When the French returned, our peasants sought their revenge. Many Vietnamese left in turn, going with the tide. The Hoa Hao said it was just.
115
The reporter Nguyen Ky Nam referred to a 'fratricidal war' (cot nhuc tuong tan). 116 In time, hatred between the two factions escalated and several abuses were committed by both sides. Huynh Phu So, the charismatic religious leader of the Hoa Hao movement, intended to play a political role within the antiFrench resistance which was being organised. With other nationalists he founded the Social Democrat Party (Dang Dan Chu Xa Hoi) on  September .
117 His ambitious programme of a triple revolution (human, national and social freedom) competed directly with the Viet Minh.
118 The bloody conflict persisted and led to the death of Huynh Phu So, who was arrested by the Viet Minh during a reconciliation meeting, after which he was tried and finally executed on  April .
119 After his execution, the dismemberment of the Hoa Hao spiritual leader's corpse was probably ordered, as mentioned by Savani.
120
The disappearance of the Pontiff (Giao chu) instantly provoked an uprising of Hoa Hao loyalists. The Executive Committee of Nam Bo decided to set up conciliation committees in each province in the west to find solutions to the conflict between partisans of the Viet Minh and Hoa Hao.
121 However, a directive dated  April  was addressed 'to all bodies of the administration, army and police force' and hardly supported dialogue. The urgency lay in the military takeover of the situation, complete disarmament and political neutralisation of Hoa Hao partisans affiliated to the Social Democrat Party. Clear orders had been given to 'enforce martial law' on opponents 'without having to bother about appearing before the courts'.
122 To discredit the Hoa Hao, the Viet Minh propaganda accused Buddhist followers of cannibalism and bloody barbaric acts. Nguyen Long Thanh Nam referred to this phenomenon, which he described as a skilfully devised slander operation.
123
While general descriptions of the conflict between Hoa Hao and Viet Minh forces are commonplace, very little archival material has been exploited. Yet it seems evident that terrorism was for some time the weapon deployed by both camps. As for the Viet Minh, under the aegis of Nguyen Binh, the resistance did not hesitate to use this fearsome weapon to subjugate local populations.
124 Similarly, abuses by the Binh Xuyen were equally frequent, judging by police reports prepared at the end of . Among Hoa Hao, Cao Dai or Catholic partisans, the defence of their 'holy' land was an absolute priority. Politico-military strategy versus the logic of defending religious strongholds, the political use of violence, deliberate and organised, by the Viet Minh, began to create problems because it quickly proved to be counterproductive.
The return to archival documents allows us to better identify the balance of power imposed by the Viet Minh in the South. A directive from Ho Chi Minh, president of the DRV, dated  April  and sent to political cadres of the movement, recommended an urgent return to unity to prevent desertions. It was the opportune moment to 'reduce the campaign of terror immediately', a necessary condition to restore the population's faith in the Viet Minh resistance. 'innocent religious'.
126 Systematic revolutionary violence, as a driving force of action and history, had to stop. Despite this degree of awareness, we have seen that the 'repression of traitors' throughout  had struck the peasantry indiscriminately, and communiqués from one month to the next could often take opposite directions. To cite an example, a communiqué of  June  issued by the Police of Duc Hoa recommended assassinations as a coercive practice: 'If an assassination is committed every day in the city, the people who still live there will gradually come toward our government.'
127
In , the zeal of the people's courts was denounced by the Viet Minh authorities themselves, as they realised the dangers of the population turning. In particular, the composition of the people's courts was hasty and slip-shod, as stipulated in an observation note by Nguyen Van Luong, commissioner of the military tribunal in Gia Dinh.
128 However, the move to end abusive executions was not monitored by the local committees, as shown in a French note based on Viet Minh documents seized during operations:
Of the extracts of judgments (seized on the island of An Phu) pronounced for the three months of July, August and September  by the sole people's tribunal of the VM at Gia Dinh, there were  death sentences, of which  were suspended sentences; this is an average of one per day.
 were pronounced for belonging to traitorous parties and spies,  for collaboration with the French;  for various reasons (wearing French decorations, reactionaries, trade with the enemy).
It is interesting to note that the total number of daily sentences (for Gia Dinh) is very similar for three months while on  August , the Director of Legal Services in the Nam Bo, Tran Phong Que, had sent out a circular to magistrates and Commissioners of the Government calling them to order.
He called to attention that the verdict was too often made in a superficial manner or even contrary to the rules, and that thenceforth any person who appealed to the Tribunal of the People illegally would be taken to Court. politburo in the Zone were too radical both in their knowledge and management of the problem.'
132
The accusation falls upon the political cadres of the army and the leftist faction of the Viet Minh.
133 Recent studies on the army acknowledge that, during joint force operations, 'errors were committed in political work concerning the populations'.
134 The general monographs on the southern resistance are more explicit but not necessarily more accurate:
In a certain number of regions at Hoc Mon, Trang Bang, Duc Hoa, a certain number of sections in the joint force B, during its confrontation with reactionary Cao Dai armed forces, had even wiped out a certain number of loyalist Cao Dai compatriots, leading to serious consequences, such that many loyalists no longer had any faith in the resistance, a certain number abandoned it to return to the temporarily-occupied Zone or followed the enemy to counter the revolution once again.
135
Another extract written in identical terms using the expression mot so ('some', 'a certain number') to mean the actors in this tragedy, states that the purging was carried out 'indiscriminately on Cao Dai loyalists and reactionaries of the religion resulting in damage within the community'.
136 According to the authors of the history of the th Military Zone, 'this error had serious consequences' in the long run and was subjected to harsh self-criticism. It took a long time to recover from the negative impact of these errors.
137
How did this new official history, tentative yet offering new avenues, assert itself from the s? The answer is undoubtedly political. The advent of the Doi Moi (Renewal) in  allowed for freer discussion on sensitive subjects. A prosaic, rather than political, reason might explain this retrospective regret and self-criticism. The presence of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao communities with their own cultural, economic, religious and even political specificities in the Mekong Delta are nowadays acknowledged as a factor of cohesiveness in this part of the country. In addition, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religions that emerged from a Buddhist renewal process in the s and s are endogenous 'grassroots' religious movements (noi sinh), which is of interest to researchers.
138 With the rapid growth of tourism during the last decade, the Cao Dai temples, so peculiarly adorned, are must-see sites in the Mekong Delta. The return of folklore and its commercial trail, the reinvention, rediscovery and affirmation of an authentic southern tradition, has allowed these communities to reoccupy a visible place in the social and mental space of Nam Bo. Yet, while these two religious communities officially recognised by the Committee of Religions no longer represent any potential danger, their leaders and cultural manifestations are nonetheless tightly controlled by the state. An example is the difficulties encountered with the Hoa Hao community since  following the official recognition of an association as its representative.
Conclusion: Provisional Considerations
The restitution of historical facts is a challenge for the historian working on the history of Vietnam. It still weighs heavily on the official historiography, a 'positivist' and political reading of the war and revolution. As with all historical processes that achieved independence through violence and civil war, Vietnam was no exception to the rule of bloody transgressions. It was shaped by decades of war during which mass exterminations were perpetrated. While recent research has facilitated the study and analysis of the massacres of colonised Vietnam and during the Vietnam War, very few studies have been devoted to this phenomenon between the Vietnamese themselves and the way it overlapped in different social spheres. The phenomenon on the endogenous front deserves greater attention because it provides key insights into the nature of human relationships in this country. Several provisional conclusions emerge: -The importance of the geographic, social and mental sphere of this region invites questions. Politics of territory and identity intertwined and confronted each other before they could co-operate and live in harmony. 139 The importance of the political context: the year  was a decisive turning point in FrancoVietnamese relations, amid negotiations, the search for a national alternative to Ho Chi Minh, and the conduct of war. In particular, the Mekong Delta was the crucial stage where the 'rice battle' took place, thus affecting the popular mindset and hence affecting the course of the war. This was a paradoxical space where 'the breakdown in social trust' was mixed with a patchwork of small zones with divergent interests. This formed a terrain that favoured the rise of diverse belief systems and violence in situations beset with conflict. From the nineteenth century, the growth of local messianisms and millenarianisms heightened as imperialist structures crumbled.
140 Moreover, the rebels' successes were not solely due to a geographic configuration that favoured ambush. One had to consider the particular 'atmosphere prevalent in Cochinchina'. Since Viet Minh power in the South was short-lived, the failures and abuses of the ICP were not as easily perceived as in the North and the attraction of a 'resistant' ideology was more enduring.
141
-The history of massacres, which lasted nearly an entire year in , must not be disconnected from the context of violence that characterised Nam Bo in wartime. More specifically, the tactical alliance between an ideologically driven Viet Minh, upholder of law and modernity, and a striking force assembled with underworld elements, supporting violence, merits further studies in order to better understand how violence was organised along with the mechanisms leading to its rapid rise. The 'dynamic of fanaticism', described by historian Claude Gautier, and its 'double tier', referring to the collusion of an exacerbated politico-religious context with aggressive and arbitrary political decisions, might explain how a process of violence unfurled.
142 This micro history of the surrounding areas of war-torn Saigon cannot be generalised. However, the example of this 'excessive' repression against religious forces is instructive. It involved first a vast political operation aimed at subjugating the population to the Viet Minh revolution under the iron hand of the ICP cadres. In this sense, it went beyond the regional level and embraced the national level: for the DRV leaders, thereafter retreating to the bush; the loss of the South meant the beginning of the end. The directive of January  to intensify combat, issued by the president, Ho Chi Minh, legitimised the use of violence. The process of 'destruction/submission', suggested by Jacques Sémelin in his analysis of the massacres, applies perfectly to the southern policy of the Viet Minh during the year .
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This evidently did not mean the collective elimination of religious communities hostile to the ideology of the resistance, which would have been impossible, but rather implementing organised murder on a daily basis to impact the entire community. The use of 'legal' ideological violence instituted by the Viet Minh to confront the challenge of the Republic of Cochinchina raises questions about the political modernity that the movement was claiming to establish.
These civilian massacres also question the relative failure of the Viet Minh in Nam Bo in their partisan policies. Following Stalin, who 'had succeeded in combining the strong potential of the national resistance rooted in native soil (i.e. the essentially defensive and telluric force of patriotic self-defence against a foreign invader) with the aggressiveness of the global and international communist revolution', the movement under Ho Chi Minh was aimed at this double perspective.
144 However, the unleashing of violence, under the aegis of Nguyen Binh, discredited the Viet Minh among local populations. At the same time, a strong peasant base prevailed in a context of loyalty linked to an extraordinary crony relationship between dignitaries and the masses. Thus, patriotism backed by messianism in the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious movements largely contributed to fighting the Viet Minh on this field of action. In his memoirs, Mai Chi Tho does not hesitate to draw parallels: 'their deep-rooted belief was not any less inferior to the faith of the communists' ideal'.
145 Last, France's intervention in Vietnamese affairs was decisive because it helped topple Viet Minh power in the South. When the political veneer 143) 'The goal here is to cause civilian deaths to partly destroy a collectivity so as to completely subjugate those who remain. By definition, the process of destruction is hence partial but in its impact it is intended to be global.' See Sémelin, 'Du massacre au processus géno-cidaire', p. . slips and ambitions of revolution shrink drastically in contact with crude and constraining realities, the simple and brutal scheme of war is revealed with its cortege of horror, sacrifice and absurdity. It is worth recalling that the character 'A' from Heiner Muller's Mauser, broken by the executions he had carried out in the name of the Party, was judged by his organisation for these acts of weakness and then faced the same fate as the enemies of the revolution.
146
-This wide-scale politico-military operation at the regional level may have been led through the mediation of people's tribunals, the very tool for revolutionary coercion and terror. Regret for murderous transgressions, shared by various authors of official history, is neither the first nor the last in the complicated history of the DRV. The excesses of revolutionary justice initiated by the ICP machinery and later by the Labour Party (Dang Lao Dong) have been described a posteriori as unfortunate 'revolutionary blunders'. They were obviously much more than that. We have discussed the horrific plight of Cao Dai villages in Quang Ngai during the days of August , but this tactic of political purification also reminds us of the terror-stricken years of agrarian reform during the s. These histories of extreme violence between Vietnamese people seem distant today. However, a watchful eye over the handling of recent political affairs shows that the SRVN has not completely broken away from a process that continues to be routed through political tribunals. The binary logic of supporting or opposing the regime has not yet been abandoned, as recalled in the last instances of the declared dissidence, branded with the same accusation charges since : 'reactionary', 'espionage', 'subversion'. This raises a painful question: Was the logic of revolutionary antagonism, applied to the war in the twentieth century, with massacre as a dimension to hasten capitulation of the adversary, an essential driving force behind the cohesion of a socialist nation built at an accelerated pace and constantly seeking to assert its identity? -This discussion questions the societal model which the ICP intended to enforce in Nam Bo, which resulted in a reunified Vietnam, at peace today. By conducting a 'purification' of the society, the elimination of 'troublesome elements' with a view to favouring a 'revolutionary' product, we are confronted by the local representation of the totalitarian process which beleaguered Viet- nam for decades. Nam Bo saw two belligerent entities with different social, spiritual and political ambitions. On the one hand, educated revolutionary cadres were clear about the legitimacy with which the DRV's ascension to power provided them. They were inclined to a certain political arrogance in the promise of a new law. On the other hand, there was a peasant population considered 'dangerous' or 'suspicious' because it was still steeped in supernatural belief systems and had to be led, by will or by force, towards the creation of a new society, revolutionary and totalitarian in nature in the sense that it would rule and encompass all human needs and thoughts. New society versus traditional society, national-communism versus localism-pluralism in the context of a colonial war and exacerbation of political or religious fanaticism: conflict seemed inevitable. In the end, however, it generated a certain consciousness on the one hand and called for a necessary adaptation of 'national law' over 'local tradition' on the other. The march towards totalitarianism was confronted at the grassroots level by daily politics of religious communities firmly rooted in their territories (a territoriality that is today acknowledged), feet anchored in the muddy delta and bearers of another kind of humanism, of another world vision (Cao Dai, Catholic, Hoa Hao universalisms), other values, from this fertile mental humus in quest of the supernatural.
147 If the war served to foment the growth of Vietnamese totalitarianism, the seeds of this totalitarianism were detectable in the roots of this absolute, iniquitous belief system, that out of civil war, class war, freedom war, and here the messianic war (communism versus millenarianism) would emerge a more just, egalitarian, civilised society, a vector of scientific modernity incarnated by the ultimate catchword 'socialism'.
